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In 1984, the legislature comprehensively revised the articles of the Civil Code
treating obligations. While the revision keeps intact many of the principles of the
Civil Code of 1870, it also sets forth several new approaches. One change
empowers a contracting party to declare unilaterally the dissolution of an
agreement.' Although the adjoining comments suggest that vestinig a disappointed
creditor with this ability does not represent a change the law,2 the legislation
potentially broadens a contracting party's right to act on his own without court
supervision when disagreements arise concerning the performance of the parties.
Also, and unfortunately, the revision increases the likelihood of contractual
dissolution in the place of specific performance. This paper examines the non-
judicial method of contract dissolution under the current articles of the Civil Code
and the troubling problem of abuse.
I. DISSOLUTION OF CONTRACTS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF :1870 AND THE
IMPACT OF ARTICLES 2046 AND 2047
Under Article 1779 of the Civil Code of 1870, an enforceable conventional
obligation contained four elements: capacity of the parties, consent, cause for the
pact, and a certain and lawful object of the bargain. Article 1883 of the Civil Code
of 1870 provided that the object of every contract was "somethiing which one or
both of the parties oblige themselves to give, or to do, or not to do." In short,
performance was the "true object of an obligation."' That is what "the creditor
expects and the debtor must render."4 When persons refer 3o a breach of a
contract, they note a missing or a faulty performance.
The Civil Code of 1870 plainly recognized the importance of bargained-for
performances from the phases of formation to dissolution, including a preference
for the remedy of specific performance in the event of a breach of an agree-
ment.5 Put another way, the Civil Code favored the courts granting each party
the benefit of his bargain, irrespective of the failure of an obligor to perform
prior to judicial intervention.
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1. La. Civ. Code arts. 2013, 2015, 2016.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2013 cmt. b.
3. 1 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations § 1.3, at 6-7, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992).
4. Id.
5. See Concise Oil & Gas v. Intrastate Gas Corp., 986 F.2d 1463, 1471 (5th Cir. 1993); J.
Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 404 So. 2d 896, 897-99 (La. 1981).
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In this vein, the Civil Code of 1870 followed a two-tier system for
classifying breaches based on the gravity of the obligor's conduct. Article 1931
of the Civil Code of 1870 provided this: "A contract may be violated, either
actively by doing something inconsistent with the obligation it has proposed or
passively by not doing what was covenanted to be done, or not doing it at the
time, or in the manner stipulated or implied from the nature of the contract." 6
Under Article 1932 of the Civil Code of 1870, 7 should an obligor actively
breach an agreement-for instance, by repudiating his duty to perform-the
creditor had a right to damages from the date of the breach due to the non-
performance, without putting the debtor in default. In the event the obligor
passively breached his promise of performance-for example, by not performing
in a timely manner-Article 1933 of the Civil Code of 18708 compelled the
creditor to place the debtor in default in order to recover moratory losses.9 Even
in default, the non-performing obligor still, as a general proposition, had the
opportunity to perform.'
The creditor's act of putting the obligor in default, aside from its legal
consequences, was a mechanism for the creditor and the law to impress upon the
debtor the significance of his performance. When an obligor simply was tardy
in fdfilling his promise and had evidenced no repudiation of it, the Civil Code
afforded the debtor the rights of notice (from the creditor) and an opportunity to
perform, in many cases salvaging the bargain of the parties. Generally speaking,
only when an obligor took action contrary to his promise serious enough to
constitute an active breach of his representations did he lose the opportunity to
correct his ways. And consistent with its preference for enforcing the parties'
promises of performance, with each party receiving the benefit of his bargain, the
Civil Code of 1870 did not contemplate extrajudicial dissolution.
As a theoretical proposition and as a way of explaining dissolution, Article
2046 of the Civil Code of 1870 stated that "a resolutory condition ... [existed]
in all commutative contracts," reflecting the dependency of the performance of
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1931 (1870) (emphasis added).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 1932 (1870): "When there is an active violation of the contract, damages
are due from the moment of the act of contravention has been done, and the creditor is under no
obligation to put the debtor in default, in order to entitle him to his action." E.g., Marek v.
McHardy, 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689 (1958); Van Denburgh v. H.T. Higgonbotham, Inc., 168 La.
461, 122 So. 581 (1929).
8. "When the breach has been passive only, damages are due from the time that the debtor has
been put in default." La. Civ. Code art. 1933 (1870). That general idea had a number of exceptions,
including performances when time was of the essence and when the parties agreed upon a definite
time for performance.
9. E.g., Mississippi River Grain Elevator, Inc. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.
1981); Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), affd, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir.
1964); Andrew Development Corp. v. W. Esplanade Corp., 347 So. 2d 210 (La. 1977); Williams
Lumber Co. v. Stewart Gast & Bro., 21 So. 2d 773 (La. App. Orl. 1945). See Makofsky v.
Cunningham, 576 F.2d 1223, 1231 n.12 (5th Cir. 1978).
10. E.g., Watson v. Feibel, 139 La. 375, 388-90, 71 So. 585, 597 (1916).
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the parties' mutual promises." Save in certain circumstances, should one party
fail to perform, the mutual promises of performances still had meaning and the
contract was not "dissolved of right."'" Rather, the party not in default had to
sue for dissolution of the contract (with or without a request for damages) or ask
the court to order the debtor to perform. As one panel stated, "[i]t is not
disputed that dissolution of a contract may only be by judicial decree and that
a party may not unilaterally declare a dissolution, or have the -power to do so
under the terms of the contract."' 3
When a party not in default commenced a suit seeking dissolution, a court
considered several factors in deciding whether to terminate the bargain or to
allow the party in default to perform. These guides included the following: the
nature of the delay; the extent of the debtor's performance; the economic impact
of the alleged breach; and the good faith of the parties.' Further, Article 2047
of the Civil Code of 1870 charged the courts with the authority, in essence, to
recast the terms of the contracts before them-to grant a party in default more
time to perform.'" But only to a point. When a court determined that the
debtor's delay in performing was significant and that his late performance did not
mesh with his intentions as well as the expectations of the creditor at the time
they contracted, it dissolved the pact" and often awarded damages in favor of
the disappointed creditor.
11. Article 1768 of the Civil Code of 1870 defined commutative contracts as "those in which what
is done, given or promised by one party, is considered as equivalent to, or a consideration for what is
done, given, or promised by the other." The revision shortens this wording: "A connact is commutative
when the performance of the obligation of each party is correlative to the performance of the other."
La. Civ. Code art. 1911. When "two parties have bound themselves reciprocally so that each will render
to the other a performance in exchange for the other's counterperformance," Litvinoff, supra note 3, §
16.61, at 553, they have entered a commutative arrangement. In the sense that all squares are rectangles
but not all rectangles are squares, a commutative contract is bilateral but a bilateral contract may concern
reciprocal obligations/performances that are not equivalent or correlative. See La. Civ. Code art. 1911
cmt. b. In any event, the revision's concept of dissolution does not rest upon the legal fiction of the
happening of an implied resolutory condition. La. Civ. Code art. 2013 cmt. b.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 2047 (1870). E.g., Voitierv. Hagan, 489 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. I st Cir. 1986).
13. Pembroke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 454 F.2d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1971). See Reed v. Classified
Parking System, 324 So. 2d 484, 489-90 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
14. E.g., Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305, 307-10 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (1979); Thompson v. Bullock, 236 So. 2d 892, 896-97
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 256 La. 894, 240 So. 2d 231 (1970).
15. La. Civil Code art. 2047 (1870):
In all cases the dissolution of a contract may be demanded by suit or by exception; and
when the resolutory condition is an event, not depending on the will of either party, the
contract is dissolved of right; but, in other cases, it must be sued for, and the party in
default may, according to the circumstances, have further time allowed for the
performance of the condition.
A few articles of the Civil Code of 1870 negated the judiciary's discretion. E.g., L.a. Civ. Code arts.
2563 and 2729 (1870).
16. E.g., Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906); Henry v. Hodges, 323 So. 2d 207
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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In Thompson v. Bullock, for example, la Thompson sold two apartment
complexes to Raymond Bullock. Under the contract, Mr. Bullock took
possession of the property and, in lieu of a down payment, placed the rent he
received from the tenants in escrow for the expenses relating to the buildings and
for his payment of the balance of the purchase price. In a short time, Mr.
Bullock did not honor the escrow system. He diverted certain of these funds for
his personal use. By a letter, Ms. Thompson demanded that Mr. Bullock
perform as he had promised and, within one month, deposit all of the funds in
question in the escrow account. Mr. Bullock did not comply, prompting Ms.
Thompson to file a suit and to ask the court to dissolve the contract of sale."8
The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Thompson. On appeal, the third circuit
remarked that, while it had the power to grant Mr. Bullock additional time to
perform, it declined to extend to Mr. Bullock any grace, for he had made no
attempt to account for the funds in question or otherwise respond to Ms.
Thompson's placing him in default. The court, in affirming the judgment of the
district court, concluded that Mr. Bullock had acted in bad faith. 9
The judicial discretion contained in Articles 2046 and 2047 of the Civil
Code of 1870 invited the courts to police and to weigh the severity of contractual
disputes and not axiomatically put them to an end. The reporters show that the
courts, in large measure, fairly supervised the remedy of dissolution, reviewing
all of the circumstances surrounding the making of a contract in deciding
whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to perform and whether each
received (or would receive) the performance for which he had bargained."0 In
short, except in limited circumstances, when a commercial relationship broke
down, a creditor had to go to the courts. As Dr. Litvinoff has suggested, that
was a workable and a satisfactory system:
The principle of judicial dissolution appears, thus, as a necessary
consequence of the overriding principle of good faith which subjects the
parties to the duty of observing a degree of tolerance in the matter of
contract performance.... The necessity of a judicial demand [for
dissolution] affords an opportunity for the exercise of the court's
sovereign prerogative of weighing all these circumstances with large
discretion. It is for the court to determine whether the rendering of only
partial performance by the obligor, plus the delay attending a possible
completion, or the failure in performing an accessory obligation,
warrants dissolution. For this purpose the court takes into consideration
the extent and gravity of the failure to perform alleged by the complain-
17. 236 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
18. Id. at 894-95.
19. Id. at 896-97. See Henry v. Hodges, 323 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
20. See Murry v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906); Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v.
Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (1979);
Chiantella v. Mississippi Mud, Inc., 170 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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ing party, the nature of the obligor's fault, the good or bad faith of the
parties involved, and also the surrounding economic circumstances that
may make the dissolution opportune or not."
II. DISSOLUTION UNDER ARTICLES 2013 THROUGH 2024 OF THE REVISED
CIVIL CODE
By Act 331 of 1984, the legislature amended and reenacted Articles 2013
through 2024 of the Civil Code, concerning the dissolution of contracts. In
pertinent part, Article 2013 provides, "(w]hen the obligor fails to perform, the
obligee has a right to the judicial dissolution of the contract or, according to the
circumstances, to regard the contract as dissolved. In either case, the obligee
may recover damages."' Delayed or defective performance may constitute an
obligor's failure to perform. 3 The revised Civil Code does riot style that as a
passive breach of a contract, for in the revision the legislature suppressed the
concepts of active and passive breach of contract.24 The Civil Code retains the
concept of default, although its consequence ostensibly shrinks to a skirmish
about damages for delay.2" Notably, the revised articles do not detail the
circumstances that trigger the ability of a creditor to treat the contract as
dissolved. However, there exist several clear-cut limitations on the creditor.
When a debtor has substantially performed, Article 2014 bars a court and a
creditor from dissolving an agreement. Additionally, when a debtor has partially
performed but the performance is not significant enough to bar a court or a
creditor from terminating the arrangement, the obligor may recover the value of
his efforts.26
Article 2015 establishes, in line with the articles on puling in default," a
notice procedure in the event of a delayed performance. When the debtor fails
21. 1 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations §§ 269-270, at 508-11, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992)
(emphasis added).
22. La. Civ. Code art. 2013 (emphasis added).
23. La. Civ. Code art. 1994.
24. La. Civ; Code art. 1989 cmt. f: "The distinction between active and passive breach has been
abandoned."
25. Comment (0 to Article 1989 of the Civil Code reads, in part, as follows: "There is no need
for that distinction [between active and passive breach] in this revision, where the usefulness of
putting in default is confined to marking a starting point for delay damages."
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2018. This is a recovery on the contract. "Contracts have the effect of law
for the parties ...." La. Civ. Code art. 1983. When there is no contract, a party who has suffered
a loss in a commercial context-flowing from the conduct of another persol-may have a remedy
in quasi-contract. Article 2298 recognizes the actio de in rem verso (or claim for unjust enrichment)
when a person "has been enriched without cause at the expense of another." See Bruce V. Schewe
and Vanessa Richelle, The "New and Improved" Claimfor Unjust Enrichment-Codified. 56 La. L.
Rev. 663 (1996).
27. La. Civ. Code arts. 1989-2000. See J. Denson Smith, The Cloudy Concept of Default, 12 Inst.
Min. L. 3 (1965).
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to perform, the creditor may serve the obligor with notice that he (the creditor)
will consider the contract dissolved should the debtor not perform within a
certain, reasonable time. 8 When, however, the performance no longer has
"value to the obligee" or if "it is evident the obligor will not perform," Article
2016 states that the creditor, without any notice to the debtor, may consider the
contract at an end.
Comment (d) to Article 2015 reminds creditors that, in order to recover
moratory damages, they must place their debtors in default. Under the Civil
Code of 1870,29 in the case of a passive breach, after receiving a notice of
default the non-performing debtor still had an opportunity to perform.30 The
revision continues the ability of a tardy debtor to perform, although Article 2015
condones the creditor setting a definite (though reasonable) time for the debtor's
performance. That is a change from the judicial gloss upon the Civil Code of
1870. For example, in Temple v. Lindsay," the Supreme.Court of Louisiana
commented that "[a]n obligee has no right to declare his obligor in default
merely because in his opinion the contract was not performed with due diligence
or within a reasonable time."
Comment (c) to Article 2013 states that the dissolution of the agreement
occurs upon judicial declaration. A creditor, however, may take actions during
the pendency of any lawsuit as if the court had already dissolved the contract.
32
Indeed, both of the parties to an agreement may act unilaterally based on
perceived breaches by the other. The court's opportunity to review the
circumstances, therefore, comes after the parties likely have acted so as to make
impractical an order compelling each to live up to and perform his promises.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 2015:
Upon a party's failure to perform, the other may serve him a notice to perform within a
certain time, with a warning that, unless performance is rendered within that time, the
contract shall be deemed dissolved. The time allowed for that purpose must be
reasonable according to the circumstances.
The notice to perform is subject to the requirements governing a putting of the obligor in
default and, for the recovery of damages for delay, shall have the same effect as a putting
of the obligor in default.
(emphasis added).
29. La. Civ. Code arts. 1931-1933 (1870). See Mississippi River Grain Elevator v. Bartlett & Co..
Grain, 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981); Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La.
1963), aJf'd, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964); Andrew Development Corp. v. W. Esplanade Corp., 347
So. 2d 210 (La. 1977); Marck v. McHardy, 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689 (1958); Williams Lumber
Co. v. Stewart Gast & Bro., 21 So. 2d 773 (La. App. Ol. 1945). See also Makofsky v. Cunningham,
576 F.2d 1223, 1231 n.12 (5th Cir. 1978); Van Denburgh v. Higgonbotham, 168 La. 461, 122 So.
581 (1929).
30. E.g., Mississippi River Grain Elevator v. Bartlett &Co., Grain, 659 F.2d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir.
1981) ("A putting in default requires notice to the other party of the alleged contractual breach and
the allowance of a reasonable opportunity to perform."). See McDowell v. PG&E Resources Co.,
658 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
31. 182 La. 22, 35, 161 So. 8, 11 (1935).
32. James J. Hautot, Contract Dissolution, 45 La. L. Rev. 783, 786 (1985).
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The effect of dissolution is to place the parties in the situation that existed
before they entered the contract.3 3 "If restoration in kind is impossible or
impracticable, the court may award damages.' ' The redactors also included
provisions intended to protect the interests of innocent third parlies. First, Article
2020 provides that, when a contract involves more than two parties, a breach by
one party does not affect the agreement relative to the other parties, unless the
performance of the party in breach is essential to the contract. Second, Article
2021 recites more generally that "[d]issolution of a contract does not impair the
rights acquired through an onerous contract by a third party in good faith."
Under Article 2013 of the Civil Code, the courts retain the power to grant
a breaching party additional time to perform "in cases of judicial dissolution."
But Articles 2013, 2015, and 2016 lay out a scheme for a creditor to take
unilateral action-to regard a contract as dissolved-not so restrained. While the
courts under the Civil Code of 1870, except in rare instances, had the opportunity
to review the circumstances of each case to decide whether to dissolve or to
enforce agreements, the revision purports to limit the supervisory powers of the
bench.
The comments to Articles 2013 and 2015 contend that the revision does not
change the law but, instead-citing Hay v. Bush35 and Texala Oil & Gas Co.
v. Caddo Mineral Lands Co. 6-- codifies the jurisprudence recognizing an
obligee's right to consider a contract dissolved in certain circumstances. That
may represent an overstatement of those two decisions. In both of those cases,
the creditors relied upon specific language in the contracts granting them the
right to pronounce termination of the arrangements upon the happening of certain
events.
Specifically, Alexander Hay bound himself to construct a house for Rufus
Bush. The writing evidencing their bargain expressly ceded to Mr. Bush the
right to terminate the agreement should Mr. Hay fail to meet the construction
deadlines. When Mr. Hay did not meet the performance timetable, Mr. Bush
invoked his right to cancel the contract." Similarly, Texala Oil Gas Co.
involved a mineral lease containing a clause requiring Texala Oil & Gas Co. to
conduct continuous operations after the primary term of the lease or, should
operations cease for sixty days, the lessor had the right to consider the lease at
an end. After the primary term of the lease, Texala Oil & Gas Co. did not
operate for more than sixty days. As a result, Caddo Mineral Lands Co.
rightfully terminated the lease."
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2018. See Hautot, supra note 32, at 794.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 2018.
35. 110 La. 575, 34 So. 692 (1903).
36. 152 La. 549, 93 So. 788 (1922).
37. 110 La. at 578-79, 34 So. at 693.
38. 152 La. at 561, 93 So. at 793. The legislature's adoption of the Mineral Code in 1975
negated the rationale of Texala Oil & Gas Co. Under Article 133 of the Mineral Code, La. R.S.
31:133, the lessor must place the lessee in default in order to seek a judicial cancellation of the lease.
1997]
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In each of these cases, the obligor did not perform seasonably despite the
terms of the agreements expressing that the time of performance was of the
essence. In that light, the courts, even against the backdrop of Articles 2046 and
2047 of the Civil Code of 1870, did not allow the delinquent debtors additional
time to perform. So, it really is of little moment whether the courts or the
creditors "dissolved" the bargain. By its wording, however, Article 2013 of the
Civil Code reaches beyond the situations illustrated in Hay v. Bush and Texala
Oil & Gas Co. v. Caddo Mineral Lands Co. And that is troubling.
11. THOUGHTS ON EXTRAJUDICIAL DiSSOLUTION OF CONTRACTS
Under the revision, the contracting parties have more freedom to act when
their bargains unravel. In particular, Article 2013 offers a remedy to a creditor
tired of waiting upon a delinquent debtor. And, although the parties ultimately
must still turn to the courts for pronouncements of dissolution, they may act as
though their contracts have concluded before consulting the bench. That, without
question, provides "a measure of freedom for contracting parties not always
available prior to the ... revision."39 In most instances, the idea of non-
judicial dissolution-or contractual termination by declaration-probably makes
sense and works. But the fundamental flaw in taking this matter out of the
hands of the courts and, further, from denying the courts an opportunity to
salvage the arrangements (by ordering a debtor to perform and by directing a
creditor to accept a late performance) rests altogether too much upon the shaky
footing of the up-front intentions and the good faith of the contracting parties.
Given that the subject of the discussion is dissolution-with hard feelings and
finger pointing typically attending the situation-no one should doubt that the
parties to the agreement are not working in unison. Both the creditor and the
debtor are apt to color writings or other evidence that will surface during the
litigation of their dispute with recitations that serve their interests. Thus, the
revision admits into this already testy arena of sorting through contractual
disagreements a potential for abuse by a creditor seeking to gain an unfair
advantage or to avoid performing his own obligations, especially when the delay
in the debtor's performance is not really significant. A look at two judicial
opinions may amplify this concern.
Mennella v. Kurt E. Schon E.A.I, Ltd.40 demonstrates the interaction between
Articles 2013, 2015, and 2016 of the Civil Code. Opal Mennella purchased from
Kurt E. Schon E.A.I., Ltd. ("Schon") a 300 year-old painting by the Flemish master
Sir Anthony Van Dyck. Mrs. Mennella agreed to pay Schon a total of $350,000 for
the painting-$50,000 upon the execution of the contract and the balance several
months later. The painting never left Schon's possession." Mrs. Mennella,
39. Hautot, supra note 32, at 796.
40. 979 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1993).
41. Id. at 359.
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however, did not meet her performance deadlines. At the end of the six months,
she had paid Schon only $90,000 of the $300,000 that she owed.'2
Mrs. Mennella then made an about face. She repudiated the value of the
painting, refused to make further payments, and demanded that Schon return to
her the $140,000 that she had paid. In response, Schon wrote Mrs. Mennella a
letter demanding that she pay the purchase price in full and stting that, if she
did not pay within five days, it would again list the painting for sale. 3 Mrs.
Mennella did not respond to this letter." One week later, Schon again wrote
Mrs. Mennella to inform her that it considered the sale cancelled. Schon did not
return to Mrs. Mennella the $140,000 that she had paid." Within six months,
Schon sold the painting at an auction in London for $1.4 million. Before she
knew of the sale in London, Mrs. Mennella filed a suit against Schon, seeking
the court's rescission of the contract and Schon's return of the $140,000 that she
had paid. Upon learning of Schon's sale in London, Mrs. Mennella amended her
suit, averring that she owned the painting and that Schon had converted her
property. The trial court ruled that Schon had to return to Mrs. Mennella her
payments plus interest but that she had no right to the proceeds from the sale in
London.46
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined first that Mrs. Mennella and Schon
had validly contracted concerning the sale of the painting and, consequently, title
to the painting passed to Mrs. Mennella at the time they executed the agree-
ment."7 Schon, of course, had a security interest in the painting and it was
entitled to demand performance from Mrs. Mennella. In thait light, the court
decided that Schon acted properly in considering the contract dissolved when
Mrs. Mennella continually failed to perform despite its written demands. The
dissolution terminated Mrs. Mennella's property rights in the painting.
As the appellate court saw it, when Mrs. Mennella refused to perform, Schon
had three options: "(1) sue to enforce performance or seek judicial dissolution,
(2) continue to seek performance albeit in an untimely manner, and/or (3) put
42. At this time, Mrs. Menella demanded authentication of the painting, puxportedly to secure a
loan to pay Schon the remainder of the purchase price. Schon provided Mn. Mennella with two
appraisals. Id.
43. Schon did not offer to return to Mrs. Mennella the $140,000 that she had paid to it. Id.
44. Additionally, she did "not make or tender the... price or object to the time period in which
Schon demanded payment." Id.
45. Four months later, "Schon offered (either] to ... refund $95,000, representing the
consideration paid less $45,000 for the cost of authentication and commis';ion paid to Schon's
salesman, or to give Mrs. Mennella $140,000 in store credit. Mrs. Mennella rejected both offers."
Id.
46. It appears that both the trial court and the appellate panel followed something in the nature
of a constructive trust analysis. Id. at 360 n.6 ('lf the... contract transferred title and Schon was
not within his (sic] rights to sell the painting, only then would he [sic] be liable in damages under
a conversion theory.").
47. La. Civ. Code art. 2456: "Ownership is transferred between the parties as soon as there is




Mrs. Mennella in default and, if she failed to correct same, regard the contract
as dissolved."'8 Schon, unable to prompt Mrs. Mennella's performance, took
the third choice, effectively ending the contract by "extrajudicial dissolution" and
freeing the painting for sale at the auction in London."
While the Fifth Circuit noted the soundness and the practicality of the
revision's remedy of extrajudicial dissolution in the case before it,s" the court also
pondered the problem posed by the creditor's freedom:
The Civil Code is not exhaustive in its description of the circumstances
that will entitle the obligee "to regard the contract as dissolved" without
litigation. Because the pertinent articles are relatively new, the Louisiana
courts have not yet expounded on the issue. Whether repudiation is
sufficiently clear to allow dissolution without litigation undoubtedly will
pose a difficult question in some cases.5'
The real difficulty, however, is not in the event of a debtor's repudiation-an active
breach according to the Civil Code of 1870. That is ground where extrajudicial
contractual dissolution seems workable. The specter ofabuse is that revised Article
2013 may not limit unilateral action by obligees to circumstances involving active
breaches by debtors. When a debtor is late in performing and a creditor desires to
withdraw from the bargain for reasons wholly unrelated to the obligor's delinquen-
cy-for instance, the creditor's inability to perform or a "better deal" with some
other person-the revision provides an unscrupulous creditor with an opportunity,
simply by saying so, to deny the debtor the benefit of his bargain. To be sure, the
debtor may sue the creditor, asking the court to enforce their arrangement but,
during the pendency of the suit, the creditor will not honor their arrangement. That
may chill the efforts of persons wishing to live up to their promises and wanting
others to do the same, for, read beyond the context of active breaches, the revision
places the onus upon a party suing to enforce an agreement that the other party does
not recognize without an imprimatur of risk (that he may have acted rashly,
erroneously, or, even worse, in bad faith).
48. 979 F.2d at 363.
49. In nearly all respects, Schon acted on the up and up. Schon gave Mrs. Mennella a fair
opportunity to pay the balance of the purchase price. Mrs. Mennella refused. Schon, after notice,
considered the contract dissolved and re-sold the painting. Schon, however, kept Mrs. Mennella's
partial payment after it terminated the contract. In other words, Schon retained Mrs. Mennella's
partial performance while proclaiming the agreement a non-event. Schon attempted to justify its
conduct by urging that a seller may declare a sale dissolved and simultaneously retain the buyer's
partial payments to establish a fund out of which it may satisfy its demand for damages (should it
recover them). Stunningly, the court approved of Schon's self-help behavior: it may hold "the funds
necessary to compensate for the loss [it] reasonably believes it will suffer." Id. at 364. There is no
basis in the law of Louisiana for this notion.
50. "Schon's letters were sufficient to put Mrs. Mennella in default, a prerequisite to dissolution
by notice. We find them sufficient, under the circumstances, to dissolve the contract." 979 F.2d at
363 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 363.
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For instance, let us suppose that the background of a dispute like the one in
Mennella is as follows: a vendor sells a movable to Mrs. M for a price of $10,000;
Mrs. M agrees to pay the vendor $5,000 at the time of the sale and the balance
within sixty days; the vendor retains the possession of the movable until Mrs. M
pays the entirety of the price; some fifty days following the sale, the vendor learns
that Mr. L wishes to purchase the movable for $ 100,000; on the sixty-first day after
the sale, the vendor writes Mrs. M and recites that, should Mrs. W fail to pay the
$5,000 that she owes within three days, it will consider the contnct dissolved; on
that third day, Mrs. Mtelephones the vendor and says that she will pay the balance
the next day; the vendor proclaims Mrs. A's proposal is unacceptable and declares
the agreement dissolved, confirming that in writing (via facsimile),; one week later,
the vendor sells the movable to Mr. L for $100,000. This surely is a different case.
While the hard deadlines favor the vendor, Mrs. M's undisputed ownership of the
movable is rather meaningless if a court were to read Article 2013 of the Civil Code
to authorize the vendor to maneuver her out of it by reason of a rather trivial delay
in her performance-far short of an active breach.
Moreover, unwarranted extrajudicial dissolution runs afoul of Louisiana's
rejection of self-help remedies. A look at Arena v. K Mare' should illuminate this
point.
Mr. and Mrs. Arena shopped at a K Mart for a television. The assistant
manager showed them several models. They asked about a particular set.
According to his testimony, he quoted them a price of $609.00. Mr. and Mrs.
Arena elected to purchase this set. At the check-out counter, the ca shier announced
the price as "$341.05." 53 Mr. Arena wrote a check for the lower price, and he and
his wife left the store with the television. Theassistant manager then realized that
K Mart charged Mr. and Mrs. Arena the wrong price for the set. He so informed
the store manager who followed Mr. and Mrs. Arena into the parking lot and, with
the help of another employee, forcibly retrieved the television from them.
Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Arena brought a suit against K Mart for conversion of
their property.5 '
The trial court found in favor of K Mart. On appeal, the first circuit affirmed
and held that any contract between K Mart and Mr. and Mrs. Arena was void as a
consequence of the error of the parties regarding the price of the set. Judge
Watkins dissented, commenting that K Mart did not have the authority to act
unilaterally. K Mart's proper course of action was to bring a lawsuit "to set aside
the sale. For the employees of K Mart to attempt by force to obtain the return of
the television set constituted a tortious violation of the Arena's right of owner-
ship."'55 Judge Watkins' perspective is irrefutable. One of your authors previous-
ly commented upon the majority's opinion:
52. 439 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied. 443 So. 2d 585 (1983).
53. 439 So. 2d at 529.
54. Id. at 529-30.
55. Id. at 531 (Watkins, J., dissenting).
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As... ultimately proven in this lawsuit, K Mart labored under material
error... in forming a contract with the plaintiffs, but this error cast
upon the agreement only the shadow of a relative nullity. Presumptive-
ly, the contract of sale was valid and... ownership of the television set
passed to Mr. and Mrs. Arena. While "K Mart was free to pursue
judicial action in the courts to have the sale set aside for error ... until
judgment was secured... the television set belonged to the Arenas."
Simply put, the contract ... [was not] void. 6
As an analogous matter of policy, contracting parties should not take matters
into their own hands when their understandings break down. While the courts
of Louisiana do not exist simply to mediate differences between the parties to a
contract and to smooth over disagreements, in passive breach scenarios it is not
a good idea to cast aside the respect the courts enjoy with the contracting parties
and the public to resolve disputes fairly and impartially. The judicial expertise,
the judicial method, and the judicial temperament will often assist parties in
commercial relationships to receive what they bargained for and expected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The revised articles of the Civil Code concerning contractual dissolution
grant to the parties more power to control the termination of contracts, perhaps
to limit litigation over delayed performance and other breaches of contract. In
general, that is a laudable plan. Yet, by placing the steps of shuffling the deck
and dealing the cards-in the context of disputes regarding performances and
dissolution of agreements-in the hands of a party to the bargain and not with
the courts, the legislation, read broadly, plants the seeds of a number of
problems, namely the risk of a creditor's premature and unfair conduct in his
interest and against his obligor. The courts may limit the likelihood of abuse in
the realm of extrajudicial dissolution by construing Article 2013 against the
backdrop of the well-developed concepts of active and passive breaches. That
is a sensible approach, for repudiations are different in kind and not only in
degree from tardy performances.
56. Bruce V. Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984--Obligations, 45 La. L. Rev. 447,
451 (1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting 439 So. 2d at 531 (Watkins, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in
original).
Certainly, the limited stress and privacy intrusion suffered by the purchasers influenced
the outcome of the case; after all, they were barely outside the store when the problem
arose. Be that as it may, the employees of K Mart had no more right unilaterally to
declare the contract rescinded and take back the television set in the parking lot than if
they buyers had arrived home before the price discrepancy was detected. In the latter
situation, no one should question the lack of authority of employees of K Mart to recover
the television without judicial supervision.
Schewe, supra at 451 (emphasis added).
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